N251-009 TITLE: Network Enabled Weapons Settings Verification

OUSD (R&E) CRITICAL TECHNOLOGY AREA(S): Advanced Computing and Software;Human-Machine Interfaces;Integrated Network Systems-of-Systems

The technology within this topic is restricted under the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR), 22 CFR Parts 120-130, which controls the export and import of defense-related material and services, including export of sensitive technical data, or the Export Administration Regulation (EAR), 15 CFR Parts 730-774, which controls dual use items. Offerors must disclose any proposed use of foreign nationals (FNs), their country(ies) of origin, the type of visa or work permit possessed, and the statement of work (SOW) tasks intended for accomplishment by the FN(s) in accordance with the Announcement. Offerors are advised foreign nationals proposed to perform on this topic may be restricted due to the technical data under US Export Control Laws.

OBJECTIVE: Possible rewrite: Develop and demonstrate the ability to verify the compatibility of cryptologic key material and radio initialization settings among weapons, sensors, and shooters and to permit required data exchanges.

DESCRIPTION: The U.S. Navy has, and continues to develop, a category of air-launched smart munitions known as Network Enabled Weapons (NEW). These weapons require target location updates during the weapon time of flight to ensure that the target is within the weapon’s seeker field-of-view at weapon endgame. Remote sensor platforms transmit this updated target information via Weapon Data Link (WDL) radios. The WDL is currently Link-16 (L16) Line of Sight (LOS) datalink. Additional LOS and Beyond Line of Sight (BLOS) datalinks are currently in development for use in software programmable radios. These datalink radios require NSA-produced Black (encrypted) cryptologic key material (KEYMAT) and myriad specific initialization parameters to enable data exchange between the weapons, the launch aircraft, and the remote sensor platforms. The KEYMAT and initialization parameters are provided via entry into aviation mission planning systems by trained Naval Aviators and Naval Flight Officers, for subsequent digital transfer to the platforms and weapons. Current Fleet employment procedures generally have the launch aircraft provide the target updates, though they can also come from other targeting platforms. However, the Air Wing of the Future (AWOTF) will train and fight in a distributed environment, whereby NEW will regularly need to communicate with other nodes within the kill web besides the launch aircraft, to include other aircraft in the air wing and other Navy, Joint, and Coalition platforms. Assured communications is a critical enabler for this distributed environment.

The objective is to develop and demonstrate the ability to verify the compatibility of cryptologic key material and radio initialization settings among weapons, sensors, and shooters and to permit required data exchanges. End article must be ready for production, meet all requirements and specifications for National Security Agency (NSA) certification for handling of cryptographic key material, and supportable by current and future Fleet logistics.

The Fleet is struggling to improve the success rate of NEW employment in training and exercises due to the intolerance of any faults, errors, or omissions in the data entry and transfer process. To reduce the operational burden on aviators and to significantly raise the success rate of NEW employment, the Fleet requires a mission data verification capability to verify the aircraft and weapon dataloads are compatible and will result in successful data exchange after the weapon is launched. This verification must occur while aircrew are still near the mission planning system, to allow timely correction of errors. Waiting to verify correct initialization until the aircrew are in the aircraft with engines and systems online delays flight events and breaks aircraft carrier emissions control (EMCON) conditions required in wartime. In addition, not all NEW are capable of radio initialization verification before launch.

The flight test community at Naval Air Warfare Center Weapons Division, China Lake, CA, has developed a device that meets some of the Fleet requirements. However, it uses NSA Type 1 certified flight-worthy radios, has a user interface built for engineers instead of aircrew, and is of a size and weight unsuitable for deployed use aboard aircraft carriers and at remote operating locations ashore. This solution also requires a separate instantiation for each model of WDL radio currently in use.

The Fleet requires a solution that addresses the shortcomings of the device in use by the flight test community. A fieldable, sustainable, and usable solution must have a small footprint, easily stowable and transportable by aircrew and squadrons. In this regard, a software-only solution that can run on a laptop would be preferred, but not to the detriment of other requirements. It must be producible at a per-unit price below that of flight-worthy hardware, if possible. The solution must be capable of using the actual datalink initialization files from mission planning, including operational KEYMAT. The solution sought must work for every type of L16 terminal currently fielded in naval aircraft and weapons and must be architected to be easily and quickly updateable to work with new radios and new datalinks as they are fielded. Success is the ability to use NSA sourced Key Encryption Keys (KEKs) to decrypt Key Management Infrastructure (KMI) wrapped Traffic Encryption Keys (TEKs) in support of Navy missions. Key formats follow the NSA Cryptomodernized Key Specifications for L16 and vendor specific key splits that enable the radio operation. It must not produce any electronic emissions. It must be simple to use by trained aircrew and must take minimal time to produce a result. If the solution determines that the dataloads are not compatible, it should be able to inform the aircrew of exactly which parameter or data is causing the incompatibility. However, this feature is not required for fielding.

Work produced in Phase II may become classified. Note: The prospective contractor(s) must be U.S. owned and operated with no foreign influence as defined by 32 U.S.C. § 2004.20 et seq., National Industrial Security Program Executive Agent and Operating Manual, unless acceptable mitigating procedures can and have been implemented and approved by the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) formerly Defense Security Service (DSS). The selected contractor must be able to acquire and maintain a secret level facility and Personnel Security Clearances. This will allow contractor personnel to perform on advanced phases of this project as set forth by DCSA and NAVAIR in order to gain access to classified information pertaining to the national defense of the United States and its allies; this will be an inherent requirement. The selected company will be required to safeguard classified material during the advanced phases of this contract IAW the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM), which can be found at Title 32, Part 2004.20 of the Code of Federal Regulations.

PHASE I: Identify and design a concept that, with minimal to no aircrew action (besides providing access to the dataload from the mission planning system), ingests the planned L16 radio KEYMAT and initialization parameters for multiple aircraft within the carrier air wing (CVW), multiple weapon types (all current deployed NEW), and multiple weapons (i.e., a single weapon type carried by multiple aircraft to be employed as a salvo), tests whether the combination of KEYMAT and radio initialization will allow the required data exchanges, and provide aircrew an indication of success or failure. Emphasis should be on currently fielded aircraft, weapons, and radios. Phase I deliverables include a detailed description of the proposed solution, a detailed plan for development of a proof-of-concept capability, and a proposed cost and schedule for Phase II. The plan should include a draft NSA certification plan (if required by the proposed solution). The Phase I effort will include prototype plans to be developed under Phase II.

PHASE II: Design, develop, and deliver a proof-of-concept solution as described in the Phase I deliverables. Produce an NSA reviewed certification plan and tailored Information Assurance Requirements (as required). Expand the design to accommodate emerging waveforms and WDLs. Assess and report the utility/feasibility of adding BLOS radios. Provide cost and schedule estimate for transition to production and production of IOC quantities, as well as sparing and support plan.

Work in Phase II may become classified. Please see note in the Description section.

PHASE III DUAL USE APPLICATIONS: Obtain final approved NSA certification (as required). Partner as necessary for transition to production and sustainment. Produce IOC quantities (approximately 10–32 units). These units will be deployed aboard U.S. Navy aircraft carriers and to Master Jet Bases for use by strike fighter squadrons for NEW training.

The capability will have dual-use/commercial application benefits supporting commercial sales of UAV/drones requiring data link mission systems software uploading in either a classified or non-classified environment. Having a key validation tool will provide the quality checks and balances required to assure mission success.

REFERENCES:

1. Air Land Sea Application Center. "TADIL J Introduction to tactical digital information link J and quick reference guide." TRADOC-MCCDC-NWDC-Air Force Doctrine Center (AFDC), June 2000W. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/citations/tr/ADA404334

2. Van Ovost, J. D. "Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual: Link 16 Joint Key Management Plan (CJCSM 6520.01B)." CJCS, April 28, 2015. https:/www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/training/jid/cjcsm6520.01b_link16.pdf?ver=2020-08-17-105423-043

3. Northrop Grumman. "135-02-005: Understanding voice and data link Networking: Northrop Grumman's guide to secure tactical data links." Northrop Grumman, December 2014. https://dl.icdst.org/pdfs/files/e90d37a9b93e2e607206320ea07d7ad2.pdf

4. "J-series messages." https://www.bing.com/search?q=link+16+messages&form=ANSNB1&refig=6E4CFE6658954FE5B7CE5534C5DD6764&pc=U531&sp=3&lq=0&qs=AS&pq=link-16&sk=LS1AS1&sc=10-7&cvid=6e4cfe6658954fe5b7ce5534c5dd6764

5. "Weapons system open architecture." https://www.bing.com/search?q=weapons+system+open+architecture&qs=SC&pq=weapons+systems+open+&sc=10-21&cvid=49B1AFAC989445FCB527EB22A1D81629&FORM=QBRE&sp=1&ghc=2&lq=0

6. Holmes, E. "New technical standard refines open solution." AFRL, January 26, 2022. https://www.afrl.af.mil/News/Article/2928547/new-technical-standard-refines-open-solution/

7. "National Industrial Security Program Executive Agent and Operating Manual (NISP), 32 U.S.C. § 2004.20 et seq. (1993)." https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-32/subtitle-B/chapter-XX/part-2004

KEYWORDS: Network Enabled Weapons; Link-16; Initialization Parameters; Assured Communications; Mission Data Verification; NSA Type 1 Encryption

TPOC 1: Jeff Sheehan
(240) 496-5292
Email: [email protected]

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