N242-081 TITLE: Electronic Threat Detection for Countermeasure Support
OUSD (R&E) CRITICAL TECHNOLOGY AREA(S): Advanced Computing and Software
The technology within this topic is restricted under the International Traffic in Arms Regulation (ITAR), 22 CFR Parts 120-130, which controls the export and import of defense-related material and services, including export of sensitive technical data, or the Export Administration Regulation (EAR), 15 CFR Parts 730-774, which controls dual use items. Offerors must disclose any proposed use of foreign nationals (FNs), their country(ies) of origin, the type of visa or work permit possessed, and the statement of work (SOW) tasks intended for accomplishment by the FN(s) in accordance with the Announcement. Offerors are advised foreign nationals proposed to perform on this topic may be restricted due to the technical data under US Export Control Laws.
OBJECTIVE: Demonstrate a technology capable of extracting actionable information from in real-time and wideband electronic threats including low-probability-of-intercept (LPI)/low-probability-of-detection (LPD) transmissions to support electronic attack countermeasures. For this technology, develop a set of performance metrics to identify which threats may be identified, and what information may be extracted from the detected threat.
DESCRIPTION: Knowledge of the electromagnetic battlefield is imperative for any situational awareness (SA) system. Monitoring persistent threats allows for appropriate countermeasures and the development of effective tactics to neutralize or exploit them. Such threats may include unauthorized communication signals in our networks or red force communications, radar emissions, and other forms of electronic warfare signals. These SA systems must be able to identify threats quickly and accurately in dynamic operational environments to provide meaningful information to an operator or Electronic Warfare (EW) system. These environments may include adverse conditions such as dense, irrelevant signals density (a "noisy environment"), weak signals with low-signal-to-noise ratios, LPI/LPD transmissions, heavy cosite interference, and jamming. LPI/LPI threats can include waveforms that employ fast frequency hopping or Direct Sequence Spread Spectrum techniques (DSSS).
Proposals must define a detailed path to an experimental demonstration of the proposed threat detection mechanisms during the Phase I period and an expanded plan for demonstrating a functional prototype platform before the end of the Phase II period. Phase I should include a detailed synopsis of the technology’s threat information extraction capabilities, its limitations, a roadmap to overcome these limitations, and a feasible proposed platform for Phase II execution. A successful Phase II should include a non-hardened prototype capable of ingesting real-time data and characterize the prototype in terms of the performance metrics defined in Phase I. It is anticipated that the hardware elements sufficient to develop, test, and demonstrate electronic threat detection already exist. Therefore, the proposed effort should utilize Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) hardware as much as practical.
Work produced in Phase II may become classified. Note: The prospective contractor(s) must be U.S. owned and operated with no foreign influence as defined by 32 U.S.C. § 2004.20 et seq., National Industrial Security Program Executive Agent and Operating Manual, unless acceptable mitigating procedures can and have been implemented and approved by the Defense Counterintelligence and Security Agency (DCSA) formerly Defense Security Service (DSS). The selected contractor must be able to acquire and maintain a secret level facility and Personnel Security Clearances. This will allow contractor personnel to perform on advanced phases of this project as set forth by DCSA and NAVAIR in order to gain access to classified information pertaining to the national defense of the United States and its allies; this will be an inherent requirement. The selected company will be required to safeguard classified material during the advanced phases of this contract IAW the National Industrial Security Program Operating Manual (NISPOM), which can be found at Title 32, Part 2004.20 of the Code of Federal Regulations.
PHASE I: Demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed wideband threat detection mechanisms of countermeasure support functionality. The threshold and objective performance of wideband threat waveform are 1 GHz and 2 GHz respectively. A successful Phase I should include a detailed synopsis of the technology’s threat information extraction capabilities, its limitations, a roadmap to overcome these limitations, and a feasible proposed platform for Phase II execution. Prepare a preliminary Phase II plan that describes how to scale the performance metrics explored within the Phase I feasibility study. The Phase I effort will include prototype plans to be developed under Phase II.
PHASE II: Develop a prototype system that can demonstrate the threat information extraction performed in Phase I. Include a non-hardened prototype capable of ingesting real-time data and characterize the prototype in terms of the performance metrics defined in Phase I. Phase II shall overcome the technical limitations outlined in Phase I, and further quantify which limitations are insurmountable and therefore bound the scope of system capabilities.
Work in Phase II may become classified. Please see note in Description paragraph.
PHASE III DUAL USE APPLICATIONS: Include the demonstrated prototype in an end-to-end receiver demonstration for a classified program.
The importance of encrypted communications has become obvious to many industries after their demonstration by the criminal world. If the signals are hard to detect, the pressure on the robustness of password keys is sharply reduced.
REFERENCES:
KEYWORDS: Low-probability-of-detection; low-probability-of-interception; situational awareness; EW counter-measures; threat recognition; digital signal processing
** TOPIC NOTICE ** |
The Navy Topic above is an "unofficial" copy from the Navy Topics in the DoD 24.2 SBIR BAA. Please see the official DoD Topic website at www.defensesbirsttr.mil/SBIR-STTR/Opportunities/#announcements for any updates. The DoD issued its Navy 24.2 SBIR Topics pre-release on April 17, 2024 which opens to receive proposals on May 15, 2024, and closes June 12, 2024 (12:00pm ET). Direct Contact with Topic Authors: During the pre-release period (April 17, through May 14, 2024) proposing firms have an opportunity to directly contact the Technical Point of Contact (TPOC) to ask technical questions about the specific BAA topic. Once DoD begins accepting proposals on May 15, 2024 no further direct contact between proposers and topic authors is allowed unless the Topic Author is responding to a question submitted during the Pre-release period. SITIS Q&A System: After the pre-release period, until June 5, 2024, at 12:00 PM ET, proposers may submit written questions through SITIS (SBIR/STTR Interactive Topic Information System) at www.dodsbirsttr.mil/topics-app/ by logging in and following instructions. In SITIS, the questioner and respondent remain anonymous but all questions and answers are posted for general viewing. Topics Search Engine: Visit the DoD Topic Search Tool at www.dodsbirsttr.mil/topics-app/ to find topics by keyword across all DoD Components participating in this BAA.
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| 5/22/24 | Q. | Q-1) Is it a solicitation goal to address radars, comms, or both, or rather to focus on the LPI/LPD waveform types regardless of the waveform function?
Q-2) Do you have specific signal classes of interest (e.g. varying pulses, very narrow pulse, wideband frequency hoppers, FMCW, etc.) that should be a focus? Q-3) Are there other specific LPI/LPD signal classes of interest, such as wideband FMCW or FMCW segments/ “pulses” in addition to DSSS or fast hoppers? Q-4) What level of ID is the goal ? -- to the “ELNOT” or to a Waveform Type / Function Type as might be better suited to an adaptive (cognitive) radar or comm system? Q-5) Is processing desired to include an ability for a “Signal (Pulse)-on-Signal(Pulse)” discrimination? Q-6) Is it a goal to assess when a Noise Jamming waveform or perhaps other interference is present? Q-7) Would it be reasonable to assume identifying a Deception Jammer is NOT required? The deception waveform would, of course, be similar to the intended victim waveform. Q-8) Is there a particular POR or platform of interest that has been identified for transition? |
| A. | 1. The focus is on LPI/LPD waveforms regardless of function.
2. There are no specific signal classes of interest. 3. See previous response. 4. Both ELNOT and waveform type/function are acceptable forms of ID. Detecting waveforms produced by adaptive/cognitive systems would be a plus. 5. Signal-on-signal / pulse-on-pulse discrimination is acceptable but not required. 6. Detecting the presence of jamming or interference would be a plus but is not required. 7. Identifying a deception jammer is not required. 8. No platform of interest has been identified yet. |
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| 05/20/24 | Q. | Phase 1 guidance states, “The threshold and objective performance of wideband threat waveform are 1 GHz and 2 GHz respectively.”
Did the government simply mean that the threshold was to evaluate emissions within 1 to 2 GHz and that the objective metric would exceed that bandwidth? |
| A. | The 1 GHz and 2 GHz metrics represent the processing bandwidth, not the center frequency or frequency range of the waveforms. For example, the threshold 1 GHz processing bandwidth could be demonstrated within 0-1 GHz, 1-2 GHz, 5-6 GHz, etc. and the objective 2 GHz processing bandwidth could be demonstrated within 0-2 GHz, 1-3 GHz, 4-6 GHz, etc. | |
| 5/20/24 | Q. | The topic asks the solution provider to "Demonstrate a technology capable of extracting actionable information from in real-time and wideband electronic threats including low-probability-of-intercept (LPI)/low-probability-of-detection (LPD) transmissions to support electronic attack countermeasures."
1. What does the government consider actionable information? 2. Is the phrase "in real time" meant to be in the context of "in contact" with the threat or unidentified emissions? 3. Is government asking about different threats across a wideband spectrum or threats that can operate across different bandwidths within a wideband spectrum? Or both? 4. Which EA countermeasures does the government wish to support in the conduct of this SBIR? |
| A. | 1. Actionable information is information that the warfighter can use to counter the threat via electronic attack countermeasures. The information should be in an open, standard format that is interoperable with other electronic warfare systems that might, for example, produce the countermeasures.
2. Real-time operation is required because this technology will eventually be transitioned to a fielded system that will be in contact with threats. 3. The technology must process threats within the threshold bandwidth and ideally process threats within the objective bandwidth. The technology could ideally be tuned to various operating frequency ranges to demonstrate operation across the wideband spectrum. 4. EA countermeasures do not need to be designed or demonstrated for this topic. The focus is on threat detection. |
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| 5/17/2424 | Q. | 1. The frequency band of interest is 1 to 2 GHz, or is extended L-Band intended?
2. Should this implementation be for UAS or include land based battlefield? 3. Is there a operational run-time goal, battery life for SWaP-C? 4. Is there a desired data format, VITA-49? 5. Is there a ideal Operating DC voltage, 28 VDC? |
| A. | 1. The 1 GHz and 2 GHz metrics represent the processing bandwidth, not the center frequency or frequency range of the waveforms. For example, the threshold 1 GHz processing bandwidth could be demonstrated within 0-1 GHz, 1-2 GHz, 5-6 GHz, etc. and the objective 2 GHz processing bandwidth could be demonstrated within 0-2 GHz, 1-3 GHz, 4-6 GHz, etc.
2. This technology is not exclusive to UAS, land, or any other operating environment. 3. The prototype in Phase II does not need to be battery operated or SWAP constrained. The prototype should be able to run continuously provided it has a stable power supply. 4. There is no specific data format requirement. However, the data format should be an open standard that is generally interoperable with other electronic warfare systems. 5. There is no requirement for a specific operating DC voltage. |