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High-Power Microwave (HPM) Weapons’ Effects and Failure Analysis Tool
Navy SBIR 2012.1 - Topic N121-008 NAVAIR - Ms. Donna Moore - [email protected] Opens: December 12, 2011 - Closes: January 11, 2012 N121-008 TITLE: High-Power Microwave (HPM) Weapons’ Effects and Failure Analysis Tool TECHNOLOGY AREAS: Air Platform, Sensors, Electronics RESTRICTION ON PERFORMANCE BY FOREIGN CITIZENS (i.e., those holding non-U.S. Passports): This topic is "ITAR Restricted". The information and materials provided pursuant to or resulting from this topic are restricted under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR), 22 CFR Parts 120 - 130, which control the export of defense-related material and services, including the export of sensitive technical data. Foreign Citizens may perform work under an award resulting from this topic only if they hold the "Permanent Resident Card", or are designated as "Protected Individuals" as defined by 8 U.S.C. 1324b(a)(3). If a proposal for this topic contains participation by a foreign citizen who is not in one of the above two categories, the proposal will be rejected. OBJECTIVE: Develop a tool to model the vulnerability and susceptibility of electronic systems, subsystems, and components to directed-energy high-power microwave (HPM) weapons. The product of this SBIR will increase the Navy’s ability to protect its own electronic systems from HPM attack, as well as to determine the level of damage incurred by the enemy on the battlefield. DESCRIPTION: Advanced HPM devices are increasingly being deployed by U.S. adversaries for both defensive and offensive purposes. Unfortunately, the Navy has been slow to respond to the threats posed, partly as a consequence of a lack of awareness of how mature and effective this technology has become. However, because of the proliferation and success of these mechanisms, the vulnerability, susceptibility, and survivability of the Navy’s current inventory and developmental defense systems, subsystems, and components to these devices need to be determined, as specified by MIL-STD-464C (Department of Defense Interface Standard: Electromagnetic Environmental Effects, Requirements for Systems). In addition, a way to ascertain the level of damage sustained by enemies in the field from U.S. military HPM weapons is also required. For example, the effectiveness of HPM devices is difficult to ascertain because, currently, there is no valid method to determine whether any disruption or damage has occurred. Because HPM damage may not be readily apparent, a combination of internal signal monitoring and post-test disassembly, investigation, and analysis is necessary to determine specific failure modes. However, limited functional monitoring of the system during testing can make this process extremely problematic. As such, a critical need exists for a viable and comprehensive simulation failure analysis tool that can establish the effects that HPM weapons have on targeted electronics such as communications systems, electro-optical/infrared sensors, Global Positioning Systems, inertial navigation systems, and processors. The objective of this SBIR effort is to develop a means to fill that critical gap. Yet, finding a viable solution presents many challenges. For example, HPM devices nominally produce a pulse peak power of 100 megawatts or greater. Furthermore, some mechanisms generate a single pulse, while others produce multiple pulses. In addition, the means of delivery can vary dramatically, such as by an individual, via vehicles, or from large ground structures. Moreover, unlike kinetic weapon effects, HPM weapon effects can result in signal interference and/or physical destruction. So, while a reasonable starting point is to adapt the processes and methodologies developed in kinetic weapon survivability testing, including electronic forensics and failure analysis, a novel approach must be taken to devise a tool that will provide the necessary functionality. Another obstacle is that HPM coupling and interference/destruction mechanisms are stochastic in nature and thus have a high degree of variability. Therefore, coupling the internal signal monitoring with damage assessed by inspection will be essential to coupling the modeling with the actual HPM effects. The aforementioned factors all contribute to the complexity of the problem presented. Thus, finding a functional concept will entail a high level of creativity, ingenuity, and technical acumen. PHASE I: Develop a conceptual framework consisting of an analytical approach and process definition that meets the stated objective. Conduct modeling and simulation to demonstrate the feasibility of the proposed concept to successfully function in a relevant scenario provided by the government. PHASE II: Refine the framework and develop and demonstrate the failure analysis process. Validate the simulation capability through detailed component testing and simulation. PHASE III: Transition the tool to applicable engineering and operational communities, such as those in the areas of conceptual design, component selection, and mission planning. PRIVATE SECTOR COMMERCIAL POTENTIAL/DUAL-USE APPLICATIONS: The tool and processes developed under this effort will improve the hardening, shielding, and grounding of a myriad of electronic components and thus enable them to operate in high-radio-frequency environments. In addition, transition to multiple military sponsors is possible. For instance, there are various other applications for HPM devices, such as in radar or electronic warfare. REFERENCES: 2. Goransson, G., "HPM effects on electronic components and the importance of this knowledge in evaluation of system susceptibility," Electromagnetic Compatibility, 1999 IEEE International Symposium on, vol.1, no., pp.543-548 vol.1, 1999 doi: 10.1109/ISEMC.1999.812964 3. Department of Defense. (2010). "Department of Defense Interface Standard: Electromagnetic Environmental Effects, Requirements for Systems" (DOD publication MIL STD 464C). Washington, DC: Author. Retrieved on 31 May 2011 from http://www.everyspec.com/MIL-STD/MIL-STD+(0300+-+0499)/MIL-STD-464C_28312/ 4. Department of Defense. (1990, January). "Department of Defense methodology guidelines for high power microwave (HPM) susceptibility assessments" (Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Document DDV-90-0017). Washington, D.C.: Chesser, N. J. (Ed.). 5. Department of Defense. (2010, April 16). "Department of Defense test methodology guidelines for high power microwave weapon systems." KEYWORDS: Forensics; Failure Analysis; Directed Energy Weapons; High Power Microwave (HPM); Vulnerability; Survivability
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